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Mutual Fund Sales Notice Fees: Are A
Handful of States Unconstitutionally Exacting
$200 Million Each Year?
by DAVID M. GEFFEN*
Introduction
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996'
("NSMIA") preempted state regulations and registration
requirements applicable to mutual funds,' thereby providing for
exclusive federal jurisdiction over the operation of mutual funds and
the contents of a mutual fund's prospectus.? At the same time,
NSMIA preserved state antifraud authority with respect to local sales
of mutual fund shares. NSMIA also preserved state authority to
require mutual funds to file sales reports, indicating the value of
shares sold or to be sold to persons located within the state, and to
require mutual funds to pay filing fees in connection with the sales
reports.
* Counsel, Dechert LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; J.D. Harvard Law School 1987; S.B.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 1984. Mr. Geffen specializes in working
with mutual funds and their investment advisers. He is the author of A Shaky Future for
Securities Act Claims Against Mutual Funds, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 20 (2009).
The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Virginia Chapman of National
Regulatory Services, part of BankersAccuity, who provided much-needed industry color,
and the editorial assistance of Joshua M. Katz, Amber Kopp, Kirsten S. Linder, and
Kaitlin McGrath, 2012 Summer Associates at Dechert LLP. However, any errors herein
are the author's, and the opinions and conclusions expressed herein are not necessarily
those of Dechert LLP.
1. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"), Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. The discussion in this article is limited to federally registered open-end
investment companies (mutual funds) and excludes companies that are exchange-traded
funds.
3. The principal part of a registration statement is the prospectus. Therefore, for
brevity, throughout this article, the term "prospectus" is used as shorthand for the mutual
fund's registration statement.
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Currently, every state, except Florida, requires mutual funds to
file sales reports (hereinafter, "notice filings") and to pay filing fees
with the notice filings (hereinafter, "notice filing fees"). A typical
notice filing fee is based upon the value of the shares that a mutual
fund sells to persons located in the state, subject to some annual
maximum. In six states (hereinafter, "Premium Fee States"), the
notice filing fees paid by mutual funds are disproportionately greater
than the notice filing fees paid by mutual funds to the remaining
states. The Premium Fee States account for only 15 percent of the
U.S. population. However, each year, the six Premium Fee States are
paid approximately 50 percent, or about $200 million, of the total
notice filing fees paid by mutual funds to all states.
This article examines the constitutional validity of the Premium
Fee States' disproportionate notice filing fees. These fees are either
state "regulatory fees"' or state taxes. The Commerce Clause' limits
the power of the states to exact regulatory fees from interstate
commerce, and both the Due Process Clause' and the Commerce
Clause limit the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. This
article concludes that, regardless of whether these fees are deemed to
be state regulatory fees or state taxes, the Premium Fee States' notice
filing fees are constitutionally invalid and, therefore, should be struck
down.
Striking down the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees will
have significant financial implications for mutual funds and their
investors. Collectively, over the last three years, the Premium Fee
States have unconstitutionally exacted approximately $600 million
from mutual funds.' The funds may be able to recover roughly this
amount from the Premium Fee States through negotiation or
litigation. Prospectively, eliminating the annual $200-million
unconstitutional exaction would be equivalent, in present value
dollars, to a one-time savings by mutual funds of between $2 billion
and $4 billion.
4. The six states are: Texas, Washington, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and
West Virginia.
5. A state imposes a regulatory fee to reimburse the state for costs incurred in
regulating or policing a type of business or an activity. See infra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
& See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Part I explains the basic structure and operation of a mutual fund
to show that, due to the way mutual fund shares are priced, a fund's
expenses, which include notice filing fees, are borne dollar-for-dollar
by the mutual fund's investors. Part I also explains why mutual funds,
unlike publicly owned operating companies, are continuously selling
their shares. This fact is important because the Premium Fee States'
notice filing fees are based on the value of the shares sold by mutual
funds.
Part II of this article describes the conflicts that arose in the late
1970s between state and federal regulation of mutual fund operations
and share sales, and how these conflicts ultimately led to NSMIA's
enactment.
Part III of this article analyzes the notice filing fee regimes in
most states and compares these states to the Premium Fee States.
Part III also presents the aggregate notice filing fees paid by mutual
funds to each Premium Fee State in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
In Part IV and Part V, this article examines whether the
Premium Fee States' notice filing fees are constitutionally valid. Part
IV analyzes the notice filing fees as regulatory fees and concludes that
these fees are constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause.
Part V analyzes the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees as state
taxes and concludes that these fees are constitutionally invalid on due
process and Commerce Clause grounds.
In light of the combined length of Parts IV and V, Part VI of this
article briefly summarizes the constitutional bases for rejecting the
Premium Fee States' notice filing fees both as regulatory fees and as
state taxes.
Finally, Part VII examines a variety of issues that mutual funds'
advisers and boards of trustees or directors may want to consider in
developing strategies to recover notice filing fees previously exacted
unconstitutionally by the Premium Fee States, and to persuade the
Premium Fee States to reduce their notice filing fees to adhere to
constitutional requirements. The costs to recover previously paid
fees, as well as the costs to obtain relief prospectively, may be
prohibitive for any single family of mutual funds. The cost-benefit
uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that, if a single family of mutual
funds were to succeed in obtaining compensation from a Premium
Fee State, or in persuading a Premium Fee State to adhere to
constitutional requirements, that success would benefit all competing
67Fall 2012] MUTUAL FUND SALES NOTICE FEES
mutual fund families. Therefore, a "free rider" collective action
problem would arise. Among other issues, Part VII describes how
this collective action problem can be resolved if all mutual funds rely
on a single representative with the costs underwritten by all funds.
I. Mutual Fund Characteristics
A mutual fund is a legal entity that pools money from investors
for the purpose of investing in a diversified portfolio of securities,
such as stocks, bonds and other assets.o Each mutual fund contracts
with an investment adviser, which provides day-to-day professional
management for the fund's portfolio.
Mutual funds are attractive to many investors because mutual
funds, in general, offer investors professional management and
exposure to a diversified portfolio of securities at an affordable cost.
In addition, mutual funds offer investors a liquid investment because
mutual fund shares must be redeemed by the fund when the
shareholder chooses.
Mutual fund shares are not traded on a stock exchange.
Investors invest in a mutual fund by purchasing shares of the fund
directly from the mutual fund. At the end of each day that a mutual
fund is open for business, the values of the fund's assets (principally
securities and cash) are totaled. From that total, the mutual fund's
liabilities are subtracted (e.g., accrued fees payable to fund service
providers) to arrive at the fund's net asset value ("NAV"). A mutual
fund's per-share NAV-the purchase price to an investor-is simply
the fund's NAV divided by the total number of fund shares that are
issued and outstanding. The Investment Company Act of 1940
(hereinafter, "Investment Company Act")" requires that all share
sales and redemptions by a mutual fund must occur at a price equal to
the per-share NAV determined each business day after the mutual
fund closes for business."
Unlike mutual fund shares, the shares of a publicly owned
operating company-e.g., Apple, Procter & Gamble, Citigroup or
10. A mutual fund is organized under state law. Of the 9,697 mutual funds existing
as of December 31, 2011, approximately 41 percent were organized as Massachusetts
business trusts; 33 percent were organized as Delaware statutory trusts, and 17 percent
were organized as Maryland corporations. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACr BOOK 199 (2012). The remaining 9 percent were
organized under the laws of other states. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2011).
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2011).
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MetLife-are traded on a stock exchange. The price that an investor
pays to purchase a share of an exchange-traded operating company is
the current market value of the company's already issued shares,
which typically varies throughout the trading hours of the stock
exchange.
To offer new shares publicly and to satisfy redemption requests
from existing shareholders, mutual funds engage in continuous
offerings of their shares." In contrast, publicly owned operating
companies do not continuously offer or redeem their shares.
Compared to mutual funds, day-to-day and year-to-year, publicly
owned operating companies have a stable number of their equity
shares issued and outstanding. Table 1 demonstrates these points by
comparing the share sales activities of Apple Inc., a publicly owned
operating company, and The Growth Fund of America ("GFA"), a
very large and successful mutual fund.
Table 1
Apple Inc. and GFA: Common Stock Activity (FY2011)
Market Capitalization
No. Shares Sold Publicly
No. Shares Redeemed
Value Shares Sold Publicly
Value Shares Redeemed
Apple14  GFA"





Table 1 shows that, during its 2011 fiscal year, Apple Inc. sold
zero shares publicly. In contrast, during its 2011 fiscal year, the value
13. To engage in a continuous offering of its shares, a mutual fund maintains an
updated or "evergreen" prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.8b-16(a) (2011).
14. Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), (Oct. 26, 2011). Apple Inc. reported
that, for the year ending September 24, 2011, the number of its shares of common stock
increased, through private sales to employees, by approximately 13.3 million shares (1.5
percent) to total approximately 929 million shares issued and outstanding. In total, these
929 million shares were worth approximately $375 billion, based on Apple Inc.'s
approximate $400 per-share price on September 24, 2011. Id.
15. The Growth Fund of America, Inc., Annual Report (Form N-CSR), (Oct. 31,
2011). The GFA's NAV as of August 31, 2011 was approximately $137 billion
(approximately $29 per share). Id.
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of shares sold publicly by the GFA was $25.1 billion, or the equivalent
of 18 percent of the GFA's period-end NAV.
While the GFA's $25.1 billion in annual share sales is significant,
for money market mutual funds, shares of which are usually held as
short-term investments, the level of sales activity can be even
greater.16 For example, during their 2011 fiscal years, the value of
shares sold publicly by the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund was
approximately $140 billion (about 120 percent of the fund's period-
end NAV), and the value of shares sold publicly by the Federated
Government Obligations Fund was approximately $212 billion (about
700 percent of the fund's period-end NAV)."
Table 2, which presents the share sales activity of all U.S. mutual
funds, shows that the share sales activities of the mutual funds
described above are not unique.
Table 2













Table 2 shows that during each of the last five years, the
aggregate value of shares sold by mutual funds was significant in
16. These heightened sales figures for money market mutual funds, in part, are due
to the fact that such funds are used by institutional investors (e.g., corporate treasurers,
pension funds) for the short-term management of the cash needed to support their daily
operations. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET
WORKING GROUP 28 (2009) ("As of January 2008, an estimated 80 percent of U.S. [non-
financial] companies used money market funds to help them manage their cash balances,
making these funds the most popular cash management vehicle.").
17. Vanguard Money Market Reserves (Prime Money Market Fund), Annual
Report (Form N-CSR), (Nov. 2,2011).
18. Money Market Obligations Trust (Government Obligations Fund), Annual
Report (Form N-CSR), (Sept. 28, 2011).
19. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at 134-35.
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absolute terms (i.e., trillions of dollars) and greater than the funds'
aggregate year-end NAV.
The following comparison also is helpful to appreciate the
magnitude of mutual fund share sales activity. The 2011 year-end
total value of all U.S. public companies' equities was $17 trillion.20
However, in 2011, the total value of shares sold by mutual funds,
$17.8 trillion, was greater.
H. NSMIA's Advent
State laws that regulate the sale of securities are often referred to
as "blue sky laws."" In 1911, Kansas became the first state to enact
its own blue sky laws" and, today, blue sky laws exist in every state
and the District of Columbia.23
At the federal level, the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing
Great Depression led Congress to enact the Securities Act of 1933
(hereinafter, "Securities Act").' The Securities Act, like state blue
sky laws, regulates the sale of securities by an issuer. Most notably,
the Securities Act requires issuers offering their shares to the public,
including mutual funds, to register the shares with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").& Thus, with the 1933 enactment of
the Securities Act, an issuer's public sale of its securities within the
United States became subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
states and the federal government.26
20. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States: Flows and Outstandings Fourth Quarter 2011, at 94 Table L.213 (Mar. 8,
2012).
21. The term "blue sky law" entered the legal vernacular to describe legislation
targeted at stock promoters who "would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple."
Louis LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 53 (4th ed.
2006).
22. Id. at 50; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 359 (1991).
23. LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 21, at 59.
24. 15 U.S.C. §H 77a-77aa(2011).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2011).
26. Congress recognized that the full disclosure requirements within the Securities
Act and the antifraud provisions within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter,
"Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2011), were not sufficiently responsive to the
particular problems of the investment company industry. Walter P. North, A Brief History
of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (1969).
Ultimately, this recognition and a lengthy study by the SEC led to the enactment of the
Investment Company Act. See id. at 678-79.
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Nevertheless, for at least forty years after the Securities Act was
enacted, any conflict between state blue sky laws and the Securities
Act regarding mutual funds' share sales remained largely theoretical.
In hindsight, this is not surprising. As seen in Figure 1, mutual fund
share sales began to expand only in the late 1970s.
The late-1970s expansion in mutual fund share sales was due
almost wholly to the expansion of money market mutual funds. From
1977 through 1982, money market mutual funds' total NAV increased
from less than $4 billion to about $220 billion (representing, at year-
end 1982, 74 percent of the total NAV of all types of mutual funds).27
The surge in money market fund assets was driven by the period's
high inflation rates, which averaged 10.1 percent annually between
1977 and 1981 (peaking in 1979 at 13.3 percent),' and the fact that,
during this inflationary period, most bank savings accounts, which
were the investment vehicle by which most Americans saved, were
prohibited from paying more than approximately 5 percent annual
interest.29
Money market mutual funds also introduced many investors to
mutual funds generally and, therefore, were a factor in the
subsequent growth of mutual funds of all types. From 1980 to 1996,
the portion of U.S. households owning shares of mutual funds of all
types increased from 5.7 percent to 32.7 percent.30
27. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at 136.
28. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE
INDEX ALL URBAN CONSUMERS (CPI-U) (Malik Crawford et at, eds., Mar. 16,2012).
29. See R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed
Away, THE FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUis REV. 22,30-32 (Feb. 1986); MATTHEW P. FINK,
THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW 80 (2008).
30. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 17 ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE No. 5.,
27-28 (Oct. 2011).
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Figure 1





The growth of mutual fund share sales, depicted in Figure 1,
coincided with state efforts to regulate mutual funds. A well-placed
industry insider has described the state battles, beginning in 1980 and
usually instigated by local banking interests, to prohibit or limit
money market mutual funds." Thereafter:
[t]he greatest change in mutual fund regulation during
the record bull market of 1982-2000 took place with respect to
regulation by the states. From the start of the first mutual
fund in 1924, each state was free to regulate a fund offering
shares in that state. Most of the time, state regulators were
not active. They simply received filings to register fund shares
for sale in the state and collected registration fees.
Periodically, state regulation involved more than filings, fees,
and administrative headaches ... Once in a while, a particular
state would impose a unique requirement. Because almost all
31. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at 129.
32. See FINK, supra note 29, at 87-94. Mr. Fink was employed by the Investment
Company Institute ("ICI"), a national association of mutual funds, from 1971 to 2004,
serving as the ICI's president from 1991 to 2004.
mutual funds as a practical matter are obliged to offer their
shares in all fifty states, an idiosyncratic requirement imposed
by a single state became, in effect, a nationwide requirement.
[Beginning in the 1970s,1 the [Investment Company
Institute's] Blue Sky Guide ... summarized each state's
requirements and was updated on a regular basis.... In
addition, by compiling all fifty states' requirements in one
place, the guide demonstrated how awful the situation was.
Moreover, the situation was getting worse. In many
cases, when the SEC simply announced that it was going to
look at a particular area or there was a press story on some
alleged problem, one or more states would start imposing its
own requirements. For years, the [ICI] dealt with state
problems on a case-by-case emergency basis. The number of
problems accelerated when the fund industry took off in the
early 1980s-funds became more visible, and the SEC and the
media became more active, thus precipitating more actions by
individual states.33
In 1995, SEC chairman Arthur Levitt delivered an important
speech concerning the dual regulation of securities offerings by the
states and the federal government, in which he stated:
The fact that fund sales are national also makes a good
case for national regulation. Some of the stories told about
the current system sound like Kafka: What is a national
[mutual fund] supposed to do when several states impose
investment limitations that conflict with federal law-and
conflict with one another?'
Ultimately, Congress responded. In enacting the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"), Congress
recognized that participants in public securities distributions were
"subject to a dual system of regulation that, in many instances, is
33. See FINK, supra note 29, at 196-98.
34. Arthur Levitt, "The SEC and the States: Toward a More Perfect
Union," speech to the North American Securities Administrators Association, Vancouver,
B.C. (Oct. 23, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive
/1995/spch058.txt).
74 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:1
redundant, costly, and ineffective." With respect to the distribution
of mutual fund shares, the Senate Banking Committee Report stated:
Currently, a mutual fund must register its shares with the
SEC and comply with registration requirements in each of the
fifty states where it wishes to publicly offer its securities.
Although there is some similarity among state's [sic]
registration requirements ... the fifty states still require up to
sixteen different approaches to regulation. For example,
some states comment on the mutual fund prospectus and limit
the types of investments certain funds may make ... This
"crazy quilt" of regulation has made registration of mutual
fund shares unnecessarily cumbersome-in some cases
leading mutual funds to restrict their fund offerings to
residents of certain states,
NSMIA effected several changes to the federal securities laws to
promote efficiency and capital formation by eliminating overlapping
federal and state securities regulations.' With respect to mutual
funds, NSMIA resolved the problem of overlapping regulation by
preempting state substantive regulation and registration requirements
of mutual funds, thereby providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the contents of a mutual fund's prospectus and operation of each
fund." NSMIA preserved for the states the authority of "state
securities regulators to continue to exercise their police power to
prevent fraud."39 Finally, NSMIA also preserved state authority to
require mutual funds to file sales reports indicating the value of
shares sold or to be sold to persons located within the state, and to
require mutual funds to pay filing fees in connection with the sales
reports.'
With respect to securities issued publicly by operating
companies, NSMIA preempted state registration requirements." In
addition, states were prohibited from imposing issuer sales report
requirements if the securities in question were to be traded on a
35. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
36. S. REP. No. 104-293, at 6 (1996) (S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39.
38. NSMIA § 102, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2011)).
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2011).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2) (2011).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (2011).
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national securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange
or the NASDAQ Stock Market.42
1H. Post-NSMIA: The States and Notice Filing Fees
Today, every state, with the exception of Florida, requires
mutual funds to file a sales notice annually with the state's designated
securities regulator. Among other things, the sales notice requires
each mutual fund to report the value of its shares sold or to be sold to
persons within the state.
Each state also requires a notice filing fee to be paid by each
mutual fund in connection with the fund's sales notice. Typically, a
notice filing in each state remains effective for one year and, on or
before the expiration of the current notice, a mutual fund must file
another sales notice and pay the appropriate notice filing fee.
Notice filing fees vary from state to state. Many states are "flat
fee" states because their blue sky laws provide that a mutual fund's
annual notice filing fee is the same, regardless of the number or value
of the fund's in-state share sales. For example, Colorado, New
Jersey, and Maine are flat fee states, and require a mutual fund to
pay, respectively, notice filing fees of $325,4 $500," and $1,000.45
There are approximately thirty flat fee states.
A second, similar category consists of "maximum fee" states in
which the blue sky laws require a mutual fund, with its annual state
sales notice, to pay a notice filing fee that is based on the value of the
mutual fund's shares sold within the state, but subject to a maximum
notice filing fee. For example, California requires a mutual fund to
pay $200 plus one-fifth of one percent (0.20 percent) of the aggregate
value of fund shares sold in California, with a maximum annual fee of
$2,500." Delaware is similar, except that its maximum annual fee is
equal to one-half of one percent (0.50 percent) of the aggregate value
of the mutual fund's shares sold in Delaware, with a maximum annual
fee of $1,000.47 Approximately fourteen states, as well as the District
of Columbia, fall within this category.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(D) (2011).
43. COLO. DEP'T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, Div. OF SEC. FEE SCHEDULE,
available at http://www.dora.state.co.us/securities/feeschedule.htm (last visited July 11, 2012).
44. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:47A-7.9 (2011).
45. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 16302 (2011).
46. CAL. CORP. CODE. § 25608.1 (2011).
47. See 6 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 403 (2011).
76 [Vol. 40:1
MUTUAL FUND SALES NOTICE FEES
The third and final category of states, and the category that is the
focus of this article, consists of Premium Fee States-Texas,
Washington, Minnesota, Nebraska, and West Virginia-each of which
requires a mutual fund, with its annual state sales notice, to pay a
notice filing fee that is based on the value of the mutual fund's shares
sold within the state, without any maximum or ceiling.
Technically, Wisconsin falls within the second category of
maximum fee states because, for Wisconsin sales, a mutual fund's
required notice filing fee is based on the value of the fund's shares
sold within Wisconsin and is subject to a maximum annual fee. Prior
to July 1, 2009, Wisconsin required a mutual fund to pay a fee equal
to one-twentieth of one percent (0.05 percent) of the aggregate value
of fund shares sold within Wisconsin, with a maximum annual fee of
$1,500.4 Effective July 1, 2009, the maximum annual fee, still
calculated at the rate of one-twentieth of one percent, was increased
tenfold to $15,000.49 Thus, beginning in 2009 and continuing to the
present, Wisconsin's maximum annual notice filing fee of $15,000,
applied separately to each class of shares of a mutual fund, sets it
apart from the remaining maximum fee states.so Because Wisconsin
now requires mutual funds to pay annual notice filing fees that are
both comparable to the fees required by the other five Premium Fee
States and disproportionately greater than the notice filing fees paid
by mutual funds to the remaining states, Wisconsin is also a Premium
Fee State in this article.
Table 3 presents the manner in which each Premium Fee State
calculates a mutual fund's annual notice filing fees.
4& See 2009 Wis. ACT 28 § 2999 (2009); WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU LFB
2009-11, JOINT COMM. ON FINANCE: MUTUAL FUND FEES, Paper346 (Apr. 16,2009).
49. Wis. STAT. § 551.614 (2011).
50. See Table 4. Of the states within the maximum fee category, after Wisconsin,
Arizona's maximum fee of $3,500, applicable to each class of shares of a mutual fund, is
the next largest maximum fee. Pennsylvania requires mutual funds to pay $4,000 at the
trust level, rather than the class-of-shares level. A single trust may have multiple mutual
funds, and each fund may have multiple classes of shares. The 9,697 mutual funds existing
as of December 31, 2011, offered a total of 22,366 classes of shares; see INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at 140, or an average of 2.3 classes per mutual fund.
Therefore, all other things equal, mutual funds would pay more each year to a maximum
fee state with a maximum fee applicable to each class of shares than the identical funds
would pay to a maximum fee state with a maximum fee applicable at the trust level.
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Table 3
Premium Fee States' Mutual Fund Notice Filing Fees
Texas A fee equal to 1/10 of 1 percent (0.10%) of the aggregate
value of fund's shares sold that year to persons in Texas,
based on the shares' offering price."
Washington A fee equal to $100 for the first $100,000 of fund's shares
sold that year to persons in Washington, plus an additional
fee equal to 1/20 of 1 percent (0.05%) of the aggregate
value of fund's shares in excess of $100,000 sold that year to
persons in Washington, based on the shares' offering price.52
Minnesota A fee equal to 1/20 of 1 percent (0.05%) of the aggregate
value of fund's shares sold that year to persons in
Minnesota, based on the shares' offering price.
Nebraska A fee equal to 1/10 of one percent (0.10%) for the first $10
million of fund's shares sold that year to persons in
Nebraska, plus an additional fee equal to 1/20 of 1 percent
(0.05%) of the aggregate value of fund's shares in excess of
$10 million sold that year to persons in Nebraska, based on
the shares' offering price.
51. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581, §§ 7, 35 (West, 2011). Pursuant to
statutory authority, the Texas Securities Board has promulgated a notice filing fee
schedule for money market mutual funds that reduces the marginal fee rate as the fund's
annual Texas sales surpass certain breakpoints. The annual notice filing fee rates by a
money market mutual fund are, for the portion of the fund's Texas share sales in excess of:
(i) $10 million, one-twentieth of one percent (0.05 percent), (ii) $20 million, one-fiftieth of
one percent (0.02 percent); (iii) $50 million, one-hundredth of one percent (0.01 percent);
and (iv) $100 million, one two-hundredth of one percent (0.005 percent). See 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 123.3(d) (2011). The introduction to the relevant regulation states:
"[Blecause these funds continuously offer to repurchase their own securities and issue new
securities to new and repeat investors, an excessive amount of fees may be paid under the
Texas Securities Act, § 35.B(2), for the securities issued." Id. § 123.3(a).
52. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.327, 21.20.340 (2011).
53. See MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.50, 80A.65 (2011).
54. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1108.02-.03 (2012).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:178
MUTUAL FUND SALES NOTICE FEES
West A fee equal to 1/20 of 1 percent (0.05%) of the aggregate
Virginia value of fund's shares sold that year to persons in West
Virginia, based on the shares' offering price."
Wisconsin A fee equal to 1/20 of one percent (0.05%) of the aggregate
value of fund's shares sold that year to persons in
Wisconsin, based on the shares' offering price, but subject
to an annual maximum of $15,000 for each class of fund's
shares."
The fees paid by a single mutual fund to a Premium Fee State
can be significant. For example, in 2010, the GFA paid
approximately $293,000 to the Texas State Securities Board," and
approximately $46,000 to the Washington State Department of
Financial Institutions." The Federated Capital Reserves Fund, a
large money market fund, paid approximately $2.5 million to the
Texas State Securities Board in 2010 and approximately $375,000 to
the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions in 2011.
Viewed from the industry level, the fees paid by all mutual funds
to the Premium Fee States also are significant. Table 4 presents the
total notice filing fees paid by all mutual funds to each of the
Premium Fee States in fiscal years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Table 4 also
indicates the portion of the total U.S. population that resides in the
Premium Fee States.
55. See W. VA. SEC. COMM., STATEMENT OF POLICY (JULY 17, 2007), available at
http://www.wvsao.gov/securitiescommissionlFiles/Registration/Administrative%20Regulat
ion%20Section%209.pdf.
56. See WIS. STAT. § 551.614 (2011).
57. Notice fees paid by mutual funds are collected by the Texas State Securities
Board. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 35. (West, 2011). Data on notice fees
collected by the Texas State Securities Board are provided online by the Board on its
website: http://www.ssb.state.tx.us/public/SecuritiesSearch.php. All other things equal,
smaller mutual funds would be expected to have fewer Texas share purchasers and,
therefore, would pay smaller notice filing fees in Texas.
58. Notice fees paid by mutual funds are collected by the State of Washington
Department of Financial Institutions. See WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.327. (2011). Data
on notice fees collected by the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions are
derived from the statutory fee rate and each fund's reported sales, which are available
online:https://fortress.wa.gov/dfillicenselu/dfillicenseLUILicenseLLU.aspx. All other
things equal, smaller mutual funds would be expected to have fewer Washington share
purchasers and, therefore, would pay smaller notice filing fees in Washington.
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Table 4
Mutual Funds' Total Notice Filing Fees Paid to Premium Fee States
(millions, except population)
2011 U.S.
Population" FY2009 FY2010 FY2011
Texas' 8.2% $85.1 $92.7 $107.7
Washington" 2.2% $35.3 $26.2 $27.1
Minnesota" 1.7% $30.4 $28.3 $30.6
Wisconsin' 1.8% $8.7 $29.7 $30.4
Nebraska 0.6% $14.0 $12.9 $13.9
W. Virginia' 0.6% $6.6 $6.3 $6.8
Total 15.1% $180.1 $196.1 $216.5
59. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION
FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY
1, 2011 (July 12, 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/datalstate/
totals/2011/index.html.
60. E-mail from Kara L. Kennedy, Gen. Counsel, Tex. State Sec. Bd., to author (Jan.
13, 2012) (on file with author) (filing fees data).
61. E-mail from Faith Anderson, Chief of Registration & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Div. of
the State of Wash. Dep't of Fin. Insts., to author (Jan. 5, 2012) (on file with author) (filing
fees data).
62. E-mail from Robert Moilanen, Dir., Div. of Sec., Minn. Dep't of Commerce, to
author (Apr. 11, 2012) (on file with author) (filing fees data).
63. E-mail from Patricia D. Struck, Adm'r, Div. of Sec., Wis. Dep't of Fin. Insts., to
author (May 31, 2012) (on file with author) (filing fees data). Effective July 1, 2009,
Wisconsin increased its notice filing fees significantly. See supra notes 48, 49, 50, and
accompanying text.
64. E-mail from Jack E. Herstein, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Sec., Neb. Dep't of
Banking and Fin., to author (Feb. 14, 2012) (on file with author) (filing fees data).
According to Mr. Herstein, of the aggregate fee data provided to the author, which
included mutual fund notice filing fees and other fees paid to the Bureau, "approximately
75% [of each year's fees] were for the payment of or by notice filings by mutual funds."
Id. Therefore, the Nebraska fees presented in Table 4 are 75 percent of each year's
aggregate fees reported to the author.
65. E-mail from Daniel Reed, Registration Examiner, Sec. Comm., W. Va. State
Auditor, to author (Apr. 30, 2012) (on file with author) (filing fees data).
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Collectively, the six Premium Fee States are home to
approximately 15 percent of the U.S. population.6 However, each
year, approximately 50 percent of the total notice filing fees paid by
mutual funds to all states is paid to the Premium Fee States. For the
three fiscal years 2009, 2010 and, 2011, mutual funds paid the six
Premium Fee States an annual average of approximately $200 million
in notice filing fees. During the whole three-year period, mutual
funds paid the Premium Fee States approximately $600 million in
notice filing fees.
State notice filing fees, like any other mutual fund expense, are
paid from a fund's assets. Therefore, the notice filing fees paid to the
Premium Fee States during this three-year period represent a transfer
of mutual fund shareholder wealth of approximately $600 million to
the six Premium Fee States. If the $200 million annual total payments
to the Premium Fee States continue, in present value dollars, these
payments are equivalent to a one-time transfer of mutual fund
shareholder wealth to the six Premium Fee States of between $2
billion and $4 billion."
IV. The Constitutional Validity of the Fees Exacted from
Mutual Funds by the Premium Fee States-As Regulatory Fees
If challenged, each Premium Fee State's notice filing fee could be
categorized as a state "regulatory fee," which is a fee or other
exaction intended to reimburse the state for costs incurred in
regulating or policing a type of business or an activity. Alternatively,
a notice filing fee exacted by a Premium Fee State could be
categorized as a state tax, which is exacted to raise revenue for
general state purposes. For the purposes of this article, this
distinction is relevant because the Commerce Clause limitations on a
state's power to impose a regulatory fee on interstate commerce
differ from the due process and Commerce Clause limitations on a
state's power to tax interstate commerce.68
66. See supra Table 4.
67. The present value of a perpetual annual payment of $200 million is $2 billion
(assuming a 10 percent discount rate) or $4 billion (assuming a 5-percent discount rate).
See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
30-33 (2nd ed. 1984). The range of discount rates, 5 percent to 10 percent, is reasonable
for this analysis based upon a comparison to the S&P 500's 10-year average annual return
of 8.1 percent as of September 24, 2012, as well as the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index
Fund's benchmark index's 10-year average annual return of 5.5 percent as of August 31, 2012.
68. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm., 545 U.S. 429, 434
(2005); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of
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To reach a conclusion regarding the constitutional validity of the
Premium Fee States' notice filing fees, the approach followed in this
article is to examine the constitutional validity of these fees as
regulatory fees (Part IV) and as state taxes (Part V).
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Restraints on Regulatory Fees
NSMIA preempted state regulations and registration
requirements applicable to mutual funds but preserved the authority
of "state securities regulators to continue to exercise their police
power to prevent fraud."69 Thus, it is appealing to categorize the
Premium Fee States' current notice filing fees as regulatory fees,
which are intended to recover the states' expenses to police mutual
funds for fraud in the sales of their shares and to administer the
collection of notice filing fees."
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to "regulate
Commerce... among the several States...."" This provision does
not expressly prohibit the states from regulating interstate commerce.
However, the Supreme Court's longstanding interpretation is that,
while the Constitution does not expressly limit state power to regulate
interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause is an implicit restraint on
state power, even when there is no conflicting federal statute.2 This
negative implication within the Commerce Clause is referred to as the
"negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause,' and provides the
Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997); Ferndale Labs., Inc. v. Cavendish, 79
F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1996); Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir.
1977), Franks & Sons, Inc. v. Washington, 966 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Wash. 1998). Accord
Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAx L. REV. 1, 23 (2007). See also
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622 n.12 (1981)(citing Interstate
Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 190 (1931)).
69. H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
70. In fact, the relevant Senate Report stated:
The legislation approved by the Committee provides for states to continue
carrying out their important role of policing fraud in connection with
investment company offerings. The states will also continue to collect
registration or "appropriate" fees that may be used to augment existing
antifraud programs.
See S. REP. No. 104-293, at 6 (1996) (S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. See United Haulers Ass'n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007)(citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53U.S. 299, 318-319 (1852)).
The limitation arises in dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 209 (1824).
73. See Mark L. Mosley, The Path out of the Quagmire: A Better Standard for
Assessing State and Local Taxes Under the Negative Commerce Clause, 58 TAX LAW. 729
82 (Vol. 40:1
Supreme Court with the power to nullify state laws and regulations
that impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.74
The Supreme Court has relied on the dormant Commerce Clause
to strike down state regulations in order to "effectuate the Framers'
purpose to 'preven[t] a State from retreating into economic
isolation..'" According to the Court, application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to limit state regulation of interstate commerce is
justified by concerns of state "economic protectionism-that is,
regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests
by burdening out-of-state competitors."76 Thus, the Court has struck
down state laws and regulations that create commercial barriers or
discriminate against an object of commerce based upon its place of
origin or intended out-of-state destination."
When a state's exercise of its regulatory power is challenged on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, the courts employ a two-tiered
approach. The preliminary question is whether the challenged law
discriminates against interstate commerce. 8 "Discriminates" simply
means that the law results in disparate economic treatment between
in-state interests and out-of-state interests." Any discriminatory law
is virtually per se invalid,' and will survive only if the state can
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny," that the law "advances a
n.3 (2004-2005); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 425n.1 (1982).
74. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978).
75. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Comm. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)) (brackets omitted). See also S.
Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) (stating that "[t]he Commerce
Clause was designed 'to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation."') (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,325 (1979)).
76. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (quoting New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-274 (1988)).
77. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 (striking down New Jersey
statute that barred out-of-state waste from its landfills); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979) (striking down Oklahoma law that prohibited the export of natural minnows).
7& See United Haulers, 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).
79. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
80. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
81. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-144 (1986) (upholding Maine's ban on the
import of baitfish because Maine lacked any alternative to prevent spread of parasites and
harm to native fish species).
Fall 20121 MUTUAL FUND SALES NOTICE FEES 83
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."82
If the court finds that the challenged statute discriminates against
interstate commerce, whether intentionally or in effect," the burden
shifts to the "State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."" By
itself, "revenue generation is not a local interest that can justify
discrimination against interstate commerce.""
The second tier of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is reached
only if the challenged statue is found not to discriminate. Assuming a
state law does not discriminate against interstate commerce, it
nevertheless will be struck down if fails to pass the "undue burden"
test enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1970 in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state
statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously
stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as
follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
82. Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278 (1988)); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
83. See Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (1992). If a state
legislature has "disclosefd] an avowed purpose to discriminate" the law will be struck
down. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). Otherwise, to
determine whether a state law discriminates against interstate commerce, a court will
examine the challenged law's "overall effect ... on both local and interstate activity,"
without regard to the challenged statute's name, description, or the characterization given
it by the legislature or the courts of the state to determine for itself the practical impact of
the law. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. Moreover, a state legislature's non-
discriminatory intent in enacting a statute is irrelevant to the analysis. See City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
84. Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
85. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
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interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.'
A subset of the dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state
regulations concern regulatory fees. These cases establish that, for a
challenge to succeed, the claimant must persuade the court that the
challenged fee is excessive for the declared regulatory purpose. The
Supreme Court set forth the relevant test in 1984 in Commonwealth
Edison Company v. Montana." In its decision, the Supreme Court
first noted that regulatory fees and charges are not "tested by
standards which generally determine the validity of taxes."" Instead,
the Court stated:
Because such charges are purportedly assessed to
reimburse the State for costs incurred in providing specific
quantifiable services, we have required a showing, based on
factual evidence in the record, that "the fees charged do not
appear to be manifestly disproportionate to the services
rendered... ." Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S., at 599 [1939];
See id., at 598-600; Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S., at 296-297
[1937].8
Both of the two cases cited in Commonwealth Edison-Paul
Gray and Morf-involved challenges to California's imposition of
regulatory fees under versions of a "caravanning" statute. The
purpose of the statute was to regulate the transportation of
automobiles, in multiple-vehicle caravans, into California for resale.
Under the statute, caravanning was prohibited, unless each vehicle
transported into California carried a special permit issued by the
California State Motor Vehicle Department, for which a fee of fifteen
dollars was exacted."
86. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142. In 2007, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
Bruce Church balancing test continues to apply to nondiscriminatory state laws that are
directed to legitimate local concerns. See United Haulers Ass'n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007).
87. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
88. Id. at 622 n.12 (quoting Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 190
(1931)).
89. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622 n.12 (internal references omitted).
90. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 585-586 (1939); Ingels v. Morf, 300
U.S. 290,292 (1937).
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In both cases, the Supreme Court followed the principle that, in
order for a state to justify an exaction on interstate commerce, the
amount demanded by the state must approximate a reimbursement
for the expense of providing facilities, or for enforcing regulations of
that commerce.
In Morf, the earlier of the two decisions, the challenged statute
stated that the fees were intended to reimburse the state treasury for
the added expense of administering the caravanning statute and
policing the caravanning traffic, and the Supreme Court noted that
this negated any other inference regarding the purpose of the fifteen
dollar fee.' The Court agreed with the district court's findings with
respect to the total fees collected, which were up to three times
greater than the expenses incurred by the state, stating:
[Tihe permit fee bears no reasonable relation to the total
cost of regulation, to defray which it is collected. [The district
court] rightly held that the licensing provisions of the statute
impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.93
Two years later, in Paul Gray, the Supreme Court examined an
amended version of the caravanning statute. The amended statute
provided for a $7.50 fee to be collected for administration and
enforcement of the caravanning statute, and an additional $7.50 fee
for the use of California's highways.94 The Court noted that the Paul
Gray claimants had offered no proof that either of the two $7.50 fees
were excessive, while the state offered evidence to show that the costs
of administration and policing under the statute were greater than
those reviewed previously by the Court in Morf.5  When the
corrected and unchallenged state expenditures to enforce the
caravanning statute were included in the analysis, the $105,000
collected annually under the challenged statute approximated the
state's $133,000 annual expenses, and the Court concluded:
The state is not required to compute with mathematical
precision the cost to it of the services necessitated by the
91. See Paul Gray, 306 U.S. at 599-600; Morf, 300 U.S. at 294.
92. See Morf, 300 U.S. at 295-96.
93. Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
94. Paul Gray, 306 U.S. at 598-99.
95. See id. at 599.
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caravan traffic. If the fees charged do not appear to be
manifestly disproportionate to the services rendered, we
cannot say from our own knowledge or experience that they
are excessive.'
While articulated differently in Morf ("bears no reasonable
relation to") and Paul Gray ("manifestly disproportionate to"), the
comparison of regulatory fees exacted to the state's cost of providing
regulatory services is the standard approved by the Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Edison. Thus, in exercising its regulatory power, a
state may impose a fee or other exaction on interstate commerce to
reimburse the state for the expense of regulating that commerce,9"
provided that such regulatory fees are not manifestly
disproportionate to the state's expenditures to effect the regulation."
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Interstate Towing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 6 F.3d 1154,1164-65
(6th Cir. 1993); Ferndale Labs., Inc. v. Cavendish, 79 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1996); Union
Pacific R.R.Co. v. Pub. Utility Comm'n of Oregon, 899 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1990);
accord Washington AGO 1953-55 NO. 182, 1953 WL 45048 (Wash. A.G.); Nebraska Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 98002, 1998 WL 8515 (Neb. A.G.).
98. Some cases concerning a challenge to a state regulatory fee-a fee intended to
reimburse the state for costs incurred in regulating or policing a type of business or an
activity-have analyzed the validity of the regulatory fee under the dormant Commerce
Clause as a "user" fee. See, e.g., Cent. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1036 (1995); New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n v. Flynn,
751 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1984). Arguably, the confusion arises from the breadth of the
language in Commonwealth Edison, in which the Supreme Court held that a Montana
exaction was a tax and, therefore, the Court "put to one side those cases in which the
Court reviewed challenges to 'user' fees or 'taxes' that were designed and defended as a
specific charge imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided
transportation or other facilities and services." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981). The Court cited Morf and Paul Gray as examples and, in
addition, cited its user-fee decision in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). The disputed fee underlying Morf was a
regulatory fee, while Paul Gray concerned both a regulatory fee and a user fee. See supra
notes 90 through 96 and accompanying text. As a general matter, user fees are "charge[s]
imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation or other
facilities and services." Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 103
n.6 (1994) (quoting Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 621). Evansville, unlike Morf and
Paul Gray, was clearly a user fee dispute because the fee in question was imposed on
airlines' use of an airport to help defray the state's costs in constructing and maintaining
an airport. See Evansville, 405 U.S. at 709. In Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that user fees partake of the nature of a rent charged by the state, based
upon its proprietary interest in its public property. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at
622 n.12. Under Evansville, the dormant Commerce Clause test of a state user fee's
validity is whether the fee does not discriminate against interstate commerce, is based on a
fair approximation of use of the facilities, is not excessive in relation to the benefits
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Typically, courts apply the Commonwealth Edison "manifestly
disproportionate" standard as part of the Bruce Church balancing
analysis, which examines whether the "burden imposed" on interstate
commerce by the challenged fee or exaction is "clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.""
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Restraints on Regulatory Fees Applied
to the Premium Fee States' Notice Filing Fees
Table 5 presents additional Premium Fee State data for the
purpose of determining whether the notice filing fees paid to a
Premium Fee State are manifestly disproportionate to the state's cost
of policing sales of mutual funds shares and administering the receipts
of notice filing fees.1 ' For each Premium Fee State, Column (A) in
Table 5 identifies the securities regulator that both receives payment
of mutual funds' notice filing fees and is responsible for administering
and enforcing the antifraud provisions of the Premium Fee State's
blue sky laws. Column (B) presents the total amount paid in notice
filing fees by mutual funds to each securities regulator during fiscal
year 2010.o1
conferred. See Evansville, 405 U.S. at 717-20 (1972); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent,
510 U.S. 355, 369 (1994); Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port
Auth., 567 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied. Because the Premium Fee States' notice
filing fees are not paid for the use of state-owned or state-provided property, it is
appropriate to categorize the notice filing fees as regulatory fees instead of user fees.
99. See, e.g., V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1426-27
(10th Cir. 1997); Interstate Towing, 6 F.3d at 1164; Ferndale Labs., 79 F.3d at 494.
However, one federal Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have treated the
Commonwealth Edison standard as a separate test from the Bruce Church balancing
analysis. See U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1285 n.12, 1287-88
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 517 U.S. 1135
(1996).
100. The notice filing fees exacted by each of the Premium Fee States do not
differentiate between mutual funds that are domestically incorporated or have their
principal place of business located domestically, and mutual funds that are incorporated or
have their principal place of business outside of the state. In each Premium Fee State, the
applicable notice filing fees are based on the value of a mutual fund's shares sold within
the Premium Fee State. For any particular value of mutual fund shares sold in a Premium
Fee State, a domestic mutual fund thus would pay the same notice filing fees in that
Premium Fee State as an out-of-state mutual fund. Accordingly, the notice filing fees in
the six Premium Fee States appear to be nondiscriminatory.
101. Column (B)'s data were presented in Table 4.
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Table 5
Premium Fee States' Securities Regulators:
Fund Fees Received, Expenses and Decade's No. of Fund Antifraud
Cases
2010 MF 2010 Decade's
Securities Fees Expenses No. Fraud Simple
Regulator (millions) (millions) Actions Ratio B/C
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Tex. State
Securities Bd. $92.7 $6.3' 0 14.7
Wash. Div. of
Securities, Dep't
of Fin. Insts. $26.2 $5.1"' 0" 5.1
Minn. Div. of
Securities, Dep't
of Commerce $28.3 $0.5' 0" 57
Wis. Div. of
Securities, Dep't
of Fin. Insts. $29.7 $3.1" 0" 9.6
Neb. Bur. of
Securities, Dep't
of Banking& Fin. $12.9 $1.3x 0 9.9
W. Va. Securities
Comm'n, State
Auditor 6.3 2.5" 0x" 2.5
Column (C) of Table 5 presents, for fiscal year 2010, the
expenditures by each Premium Fee State's securities regulator for all
purposes."o
102. That is, the expenditures presented in Column (C) are those of the securities
regulator only, and do not include expenditures of the larger organization of which the
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In each Premium Fee State, the securities regulator also is
responsible for administering the state's blue sky laws, including
administering the state registration of securities sales not preempted
by NSMIA, regulating securities broker-dealers and regulating
certain investment advisers that are not regulated by the SEC.
Therefore, in Table 5, with the exception of Minnesota, the expenses
incurred by a securities regulator to police mutual funds for fraud in
the sales of their shares and to administer the receipts of notice filing
fees is a portion of the expenditures presented in Column (C).
Minnesota is excepted because the Division of Securities within the
Minnesota Department of Commerce provided specific data
regarding its expenditures related to mutual funds. Thus, with the
exception of Minnesota, the expenses presented in Column (C)
significantly overestimate each securities regulator's expenditures to
police mutual funds for fraud and to administer the receipts of notice
filing fees.
Table 5's Column (D) shows that there were no antifraud actions
instigated or threatened against mutual funds by the Premium Fee
States' securities regulatory authorities during the ten-year period
ending December 2011.0 Therefore, Column (D) supports the
conclusion that, with the exception of Minnesota, each securities
regulator's total expenditures presented in Column (C) substantially
overestimates each authority's expenditures in connection with
policing sales of mutual fund shares and administering the receipts of
notice filing fees.
Column (E) simply presents the ratio that Column (B)
(revenues) bears to Column (C) (expenses). Column (E) thus
estimates the multiple (e.g., x2.5, x10, etc.) by which mutual funds'
2010 payments to each Premium Fee State's securities regulator
exceeds the authority's 2010 expenditures for all purposes (except
Minnesota, for which the presented expenditures relate to mutual
funds). The securities regulator in each of the Premium Fee States,
except Minnesota, received anywhere from approximately three to
fifteen times more in notice filing fees from mutual funds than the
securities regulator may be a department or division. Texas is the only Premium Fee State
in which the authority is a stand-alone entity.
103. The absence from Column (D) of antifraud actions instigated or threatened
against mutual funds by the securities regulatory authorities suggests that, in the Premium
Fee States, the costs incurred policing mutual funds for fraud in the sales of their shares
were negligible. This suggests that, with respect to mutual funds, the expenses incurred by
the securities regulatory authorities in each of the Premium Fee States arose from
administering the notice filing regime fees, rather than combating such fraud.
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regulator's total annual budget. In Minnesota, the securities
regulator received at least fifty times more in notice filing fees from
mutual funds than the regulator expended to administer the state's
notice filing fee regime and to exercise its antifraud powers with
respect to mutual funds, which it had no occasion to do.
From Column (E), it is obvious that, in fiscal 2010, the amount
paid by mutual funds in notice filing fees to the securities regulator in
each Premium Fee State was manifestly disproportionate to the
state's cost of regulating mutual funds." The same was true for fiscal
years 2009 and 2011."'
In sum, when analyzed as regulatory fees, the notice filing fees
paid to each Premium Fee State are manifestly disproportionate to
each Premium Fee State's cost of policing sales of mutual fund shares
and administering the receipts of notice filing fees. Thus, the notice
filing fee regime in each Premium Fee State fails to satisfy the
standard approved by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison.
From this conclusion, it follows that, under the Bruce Church
balancing analysis, each Premium Fee State's notice filing fee regime
imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. Following Bruce Church, the
notice filing fees in the Premium Fee States violate the dormant
Commerce Clause and, therefore, should be struck down.
V. The Constitutional Validity of the Fees Exacted from
Mutual Funds by the Premium Fee States-As State Taxes
This Part examines whether the Premium Fee States' notice filing
fees are constitutionally valid as permissible assertions of each
Premium Fee State's authority to tax. Analyzed as state taxes, each
Premium Fee State must have a sufficient nexus or connection with
the mutual fund share sales activities that it seeks to tax to satisfy due
process and dormant Commerce Clause limitations. Separately,
104. In Morf, where the total fees collected were up to three times greater than the
expenses incurred by the state, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's findings
that the state's regulatory fees imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. See Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290,297 (1937).
105. For fiscal years 2009 and 2011, Table 4 presents the total amount paid in notice
filing fees by mutual funds to each securities regulator. The sources cited in Column (C)
(for 2010 expenditures) have online analogs for fiscal years 2009 and 2011. Each securities
regulator's expenditures did not vary materially year to year.
106. State blue sky laws, as exercises of the states' police powers, do not violate the
Due Process Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v.
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even if a Premium Fee State has a sufficient nexus to the mutual
funds' sales activities, the Premium Fee State's notice filing fees must
be fairly apportioned to be constitutionally valid.
A. Due Process and Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus Restraints on
State Taxes
While Congress may regulate conduct without regard to state
boundaries, the jurisdiction of each state legislature is limited to
activities or conduct that occurs within its borders." With respect to
state tax legislation, the constitutional prohibition against state
taxation of values arising from activities outside the state's borders is
located within the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause."
The Supreme Court's state tax jurisprudence contains a nexus
requirement. The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of this
nexus requirement is to prohibit extraterritorial taxation. That is,
when a state seeks to assert its tax authority beyond its borders, the
tax could be struck down on due process and dormant Commerce
N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). See also A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. New Jersey, 163
F.3d 780, 789 (3rd Cir. 1999) (New Jersey blue sky law was valid because it did not attempt
to regulate commerce "wholly outside" of its borders, and the law regulated the in-state
portion of an interstate transaction). See generally Robert N. Rapp, Misapplication of the
Federal Extraterritoriality Principle in Limiting the Scope of Civil Remedies for Fraud
under State Blue Sky Laws, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 279, 287-300 (2011). These cases concern
the interstate application of the antifraud provisions of state blue sky laws under the
state's police powers, but do not address whether the Premium Fee States' notice filing
fees are constitutionally valid assertions of the Premium Fee States' authority to tax.
107. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 570-73 (1996) (citing
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881)) ("No State can legislate except with
reference to its own jurisdiction ... Each State is independent of all the others in this
particular"); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-8, at 1074
(3rd ed. 2000) ("[TJhe Court has articulated virtually a per se rule of invalidity for
extraterritorial state regulations-i.e., laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce,
or laws whose operation is triggered by out-of-state events."). See generally Bradley W.
Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial
State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 173-74 (2002).
108. See Allied-Signal v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) ("The
principle that a State may not tax value earned outside its borders rests on the
fundamental requirement of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses."); Container
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) ("Under both the Due Process and
the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a state may not, when imposing an income-
based tax, 'tax value earned outside its borders."'); MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dep't
of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 19 (2008) ("Due Process and Commerce Clauses forbid the
States to tax 'extraterritorial values."').
109. See Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 777 (1992) (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
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Clause grounds, unless the state has a sufficient nexus or connection
to the values it seeks to tax.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes,"o the Supreme Court
discussed the modern due process nexus required for a state to tax
income generated in interstate commerce. The Court held that, in
order for a state tax to be valid under the Due Process Clause, there
must be some minimal connection between the taxing state and the
activity from which the income is derived, and a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the taxing state and the interstate
values of the enterprise."' The Court has since reiterated this due
process test."
The seminal case in modern dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state taxes is Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady."'
Since its 1977 Complete Auto decision, the Supreme Court has relied
upon Complete Auto in virtually every dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a state tax."' In Complete Auto, the Court abandoned
longstanding formalistic rules and set forth the modern, four-prong
test for evaluating a state tax's validity under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Under that four-part test, a state tax will be sustained against
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
is fairly related to the services provided by the state."'
If there is an insufficient nexus or connection between the taxing
state and the activity that the state seeks to tax, the Supreme Court
will void the state tax in question under either the Due Process
110. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
111. Id. at 436-37.
112. See Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000); Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 165-66; Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20 (1980).
Accord Hercules Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 575 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn. 1998).
113. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
114. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995);
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990);
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66
(1989); D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988); Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981).
115. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. See also Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 183 (1995)
(citing Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (tax on telephone calls); D.H. Holmes Co.
v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (use tax); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 159 (franchise
tax); Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 609 (severance tax)).
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Clause"' or the dormant Commerce Clause."' Therefore, in analyzing
the constitutional validity of the Premium Fee States' notice filing
fees as taxes, a critical question is whether each Premium Fee State
has a sufficient nexus or connection with mutual fund share sales to
in-state persons and the funds' revenues from these sales.
B. Relevant Precedents
Each of the following Supreme Court decisions involved a due
process or dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state's attempt
to tax an out-of-state seller's sales revenues arising from sales to in-
state purchasers.
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson,"'
Connecticut General had entered into contracts with California-
licensed insurers, reinsuring the insurers against loss on insurance
policies that the insurers had entered within California with
California residents. However, the reinsurance contracts were
entered into in Connecticut, premiums under the reinsurance
contracts were paid to Connecticut General in Connecticut, and
losses under the reinsurance contracts were to be paid from
Connecticut.
The State of California sought to tax Connecticut General's
receipt of the gross reinsurance premiums received. The Supreme
Court held that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to Connecticut
General's reinsurance business because the tax violated the Due
Process Clause. In particular, the Court held that the tax could not be
sustained because "All that [Connecticut General] did in effecting the
reinsurance was done without the state [of California] . . .. The tax
cannot be sustained either as laid on property, business done, or
transactions carried on within the state . . ..""9
116. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1959).
117. See, e.g., Allied-Signal v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992); McLeod v.
J.E. Dilworth Co. 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. 471 (1872).
118. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938). Accord State Bd. of Ins.
v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 340 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App. Ct. 1960), affd, 370 U.S. 451 (1962);
Dow Chemical Co. v. Rylander, 38 S.W.3d 741, 745-47 (Tex. App. Ct.),cert. denied, 534
U.S. 996 (2001); Dravo Corp. v. City of Tacoma, 496 P.2d 504, 507 (Wash. 1972); City of
Tacoma v. Fiberchem, Inc., 722 P.2d 1357, 1360-61 (Wash. App. Ct. 1986).
119. Connecticut General, 303 U.S. at 82. In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of
America v. Low, 296 F.3d 832, 843 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), the court recognized the continued
vitality of Connecticut General.
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In 1954, in Miller Brothers v. Maryland," the Supreme Court
invalidated Maryland's attempt to impose a use tax collection duty on
a Delaware merchant on all over-the-counter sales in its Delaware
store to Maryland residents. The Court stated that due process
requires "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."' The
Supreme Court held that Maryland could not impose a use tax
collection duty on the Delaware merchant because Maryland lacked a
definite link and some minimum connection to the Delaware
transactions.'22
In 1965, in American Oil Company v. Neill,"' the Supreme Court
relied on a due process analysis to nullify an excise tax that the State
of Idaho sought to impose on the revenues received by an Idaho-
licensed gasoline dealer from sales that occurred in Utah. While the
sales transactions all occurred outside of Idaho, the purchaser
transported the gasoline from Utah into Idaho. The Court held that
Idaho could not constitutionally tax the dealer's extraterritorial sales
because the sales lacked a sufficient nexus to Idaho, and such sales
were insufficiently related to the dealer's other activities within
Idaho.'2
In 1944, in McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Company.,'" the Supreme
Court voided Arkansas's attempt to apply its sales tax to a Tennessee
machinery distributor. Any sales to Arkansas purchasers were
obtained by traveling salesmen and submitted to the distributor's
Tennessee home office for approval. The purchaser received title and
possession upon delivery by the distributor to a common carrier in
Tennessee. Moreover, all payments were effected through the
distributor's Tennessee office. Therefore, the Court held, Arkansas'
120. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). Accord Peoples Gas, Light &
Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist., 270 S.W.3d 208, 218 (Tex. App. Ct. 2008),
cert. denied sub. nom. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co.,
131 S.Ct. 2097 (2011); Neb. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 95038, 1995 WL 297244 (Neb. A.G.).
121. Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-45. Accord Pfizer Inc. v. Lancaster County Bd. of
Equalization, 616 N.W.2d 326,339 (Neb. 2000).
122. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 345-46.
123. Am. Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1965). Accord Dravo Corp. v. City of
Tacoma, 496 P.2d 504, 509 (Wash. 1972); City of Tacoma v. Fiberchem, Inc., 722 P.2d
1357, 1360-61 (Wash. App. Ct. 1986).
124. See American Oil, 380 U.S. at 458.
125. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). Accord Bullock v. Lone Star
Gas Co., 567 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978); Dow Chemical
Co. v. Rylander, 38 S.W.3d 741, 745-47 (Tex. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
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attempt to tax the Tennessee sales would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause because "[flor Arkansas to impose a tax on such
transactions would be to project its powers beyond its
boundaries. . .."
The Supreme Court's 1951 decision in Norton Company v.
Department of Revenuel27 concerned a Massachusetts manufacturer
that maintained a branch office and a warehouse in Illinois. The
manufacturer effected sales in Illinois through two distinct channels:
(1) the manufacturer made sales through its Illinois branch office and
warehouse and (2) the manufacturer conducted a mail order business
from its headquarters in Massachusetts, which shipped orders directly
to Illinois customers. Illinois sought to apply its gross receipts tax to
all Illinois sales by the manufacturer, including the mail order sales.
However, the Court held that the mail order sales from Massachusetts
were outside Illinois's taxing power and, therefore, the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibited Illinois from taxing the mail order sales
revenues.IN
Finally, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Allied-Signal v.
Director Divison of Taxation29 is an example of the current doctrine
concerning the simultaneous Due Process Clause and dormant
Commerce Clause nexus requirements that prohibit a state from
taxing revenue or income derived by a taxpayer's activities outside of
the state's borders. In Allied-Signal, the Court rejected New Jersey's
attempt to impose its business tax on a portion of the $211 million
gain that Allied-Signal's predecessor, Bendix, realized on the out-of-
state sale of its 20.6 percent stock interest in an unrelated
corporation, ASARCO. Bendix was a Delaware corporation with its
commercial domicile and corporate headquarters in Michigan.
During the relevant period, Bendix's primary operations in New
Jersey involved developing and manufacturing aerospace products.
The Supreme Court stated that its precedents permit a state to
tax a nondomiciliary corporation on an apportioned sum of the
126. McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330.
127. Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
128. See id. at 537-39.
129. Allied-Signal v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992). Accord Peoples Gas,
Light & Coke Co. v. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist., 270 S.W.3d 208, 218 (Tex. App. Ct.
2008), cert. denied sub nom. Harrison Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke
Co., 131 S.Ct. 2097 (2011); Flight Options, LLC v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 259 P.3d 234,
240 (Wash. 2011); Harris v. Comm'r of Revenue, 257 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 1977); Pfizer
Inc. v. Lancaster County Bd. of Equalization, 616 N.W.2d 326, 339 (Neb. 2000); Am. Tel.
& Telegraph Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 422 N.W.2d 629, 633-34 (Wis. 1988).
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corporation's multistate business, provided the business is "unitary"
(i.e., part of the same business)." However, a state may not tax a
nondomiciliary corporation's income derived from unrelated business
activity that occurs outside of the state (i.e., "non-unitary"). 3 1
The Court further stated:
The principle that a State may not tax value earned
outside its borders rests on the fundamental requirement of
both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses that there be
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.
The reason the Commerce Clause includes this limit is self-
evident: In a Union of 50 States, to permit each State to tax
activities outside its borders would have drastic consequences
for the national economy, as businesses could be subjected to
severe multiple taxation. But the Due Process Clause also
underlies our decisions in this area. Although our modern
due process jurisprudence rejects a rigid, formalistic definition
of minimum connection, we have not abandoned the
requirement that, in the case of a tax on an activity, there
must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a
connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax. . .. The
present inquiry ... focuses on the guidelines necessary to
circumscribe the reach of the State's legitimate power to tax.132
The one-time gain earned by Bendix in selling its ASARCO
shares was not part of unitary business carried on by Bendix in New
Jersey. Therefore, New Jersey lacked a sufficient nexus or
connection to the out-of-state sale to tax an apportioned part of the
income from the sale.133
C. For Tax Purposes, Sales of Mutual Fund Shares Do Not Occur
Within a Premium Fee State's Borders
Mutual funds engage in continuous offerings of their shares.
Among the key service providers employed by a mutual fund"' is the
130. Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 772-73 (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)).
131. Id. at 773 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,224 (1980)).
132. Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 777-78 (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
133. See id. at 784.
134. See supra notes 13 through 20 and accompanying text.
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fund's transfer agent.' As described below, unless a mutual fund's
transfer agent is located within a Premium Fee State's borders, there
is no sale within the Premium Fee State that the state has authority to
tax.
A mutual fund's transfer agent is responsible for accepting (or
rejecting) customers' purchase orders for the fund's shares."' In this
role, a mutual fund's transfer agent is responsible for assuring that a
customer's purchase order complies with the mutual fund's rules,
including any minimum initial investment required by the fund, as
well as certain legal requirements. The most important legal
requirement is Rule 22c-1(a) under the Investment Company Act,' 8
which specifics that a mutual fund may sell its shares only at the per-
share NAV "next computed ... after receipt of ... an order to
purchase." Because mutual funds normally calculate their NAV at
4:00 p.m. Eastern time, on any given day, an investor wishing to
purchase a mutual fund's shares that day must assure that its purchase
order is received before 4:00 p.m. by the fund's transfer agent "in
135. See Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2011),
which requires every mutual fund to adopt and implement written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent violation of the federal securities laws by the fund,
including policies and procedures that provide for the oversight of compliance by each
investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer agent of the fund.
136. A transfer agent, as defined in Exchange Act § 3(a)(25), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
(3)(a)(25) (2011), is:
any person who engages on behalf of an issuer of securities... in (A)
countersigning such securities upon issuance; (B) monitoring the issuance
of such securities with a view to preventing unauthorized issuance, a
function commonly performed by a person called a registrar; (C)
registering the transfer of such securities; (D) exchanging or converting
such securities; or (E) transferring record ownership of securities by
bookkeeping entry without physical issuance of securities certificates.
Transfer agents are required to register with, and are regulated by, the SEC. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q-1(c) (2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-1 et seq. (2011).
137. The following discussion presents a simplified example of an individual customer
purchasing fund shares without the participation of a financial intermediary, such as such
as a broker, bank, fund supermarket, insurance company, investment adviser, or
retirement plan record keeper. See generally ROBERT POZEN & THERESA HAMACHER,
THE FUND INDUSTRY: How YOUR MONEY IS MANAGED 338-39 (2011). Nevertheless,
the example is sufficient. Many customers rely on a financial intermediary to effect
purchases of a mutual fund's shares, and the financial intermediary is in privity of contract
with a fund's transfer agent to provide "sub-transfer agent" services in lieu of the mutual
fund's transfer agent. However, the provision of sub-transfer agent services by the
financial intermediary is no more likely to occur within a Premium Fee State than the fund
transfer agent's provision of its services. See generally INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, Navigating Intermediary Relationships (Sept. 2009).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2011).
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good order"'m-that is, accompanied by certain required information
and payment and, more generally, in compliance with the mutual
fund's instructions contained in the fund's prospectus. Purchase
orders received in good order before 4:00 p.m. receive the per-share
NAV determined that same day. A purchase order that is received
but is not in good order normally will be rejected by the transfer
agent.
For a first-time customer purchasing shares from one or more
funds within a family of mutual funds, the funds' transfer agent must
create a new account.'40 To set up an account, the transfer agent is
responsible for a reviewing account applications received from the
investor to extract a variety of information. Under provisions of the
Patriot Act,' a mutual fund's transfer agent must verify each
customer's identity by collecting the customer's name, date of birth,
and physical address.'42 For tax purposes, the transfer agent also must
obtain the customer's taxpayer identification number, which, for
individuals, is normally the individual's Social Security number. If the
information required by the transfer agent to set up an account is not
received, the transfer agent normally will reject the first-time
customer's purchase order.
A mutual fund's transfer agent also is responsible for collecting
customer payments to purchase the fund's shares and transmitting
these proceeds to the mutual fund's custodian bank. The transfer
agent will give effect to the purchase order by seeing that the
appropriate number of a mutual fund's shares are credited to the
shareholder's account. The transfer agent thus maintains the
definitive record of fund shareholders and the number of shares
owned by each shareholder, including each day's fund purchase (and
redemption) orders. This information is transmitted by the transfer
agent to the mutual fund and, therefore, the transfer agent provides
the number of fund shares outstanding, which the mutual fund must
have in order to determine that day's per-share NAV (i.e., the per-
share purchase price).
139. See, e.g., SEC Rel. Nos. 33-8861, IC-28064 (Nov. 21, 2007) (containing proposed
"Hypothetical Summary Prospectus-Prepared By SEC Staff").
140. In part, this simplified example is based on a more-detailed description provided
by POZEN & HAMACHER, supra note 137, at 338-39.
141. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), amending, inter alia,
the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. (2011).
142. See 31 C.F.R. § 1024.220 (2011).
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In sum, a sale of shares by a mutual fund to an investor turns on
the transfer agent's receipt of a purchase order and related payment,
and the subsequent performance by the transfer agent of certain
actions.143 Therefore, unless a mutual fund's transfer agent is located
within a Premium Fee State's borders, there is no sale within the
Premium Fee State that the state has authority to tax.'"
D. The Premium Fee States' Notice Filing Fees in Light of Due Process
and Dormant Commerce Clause Nexus Restraints on State Taxes
To satisfy both due process and dormant Commerce Clause
concerns, a state must have a sufficient nexus or connection with the
value or activity it seeks to tax. With respect to mutual funds, the
activity and value that each Premium Fee State seeks to tax are
mutual fund share sales to in-state persons and the funds' revenues
from these sales.
However, because the sales of mutual fund shares occur where
the fund's transfer agent is located, which normally will be outside of
the Premium Fee State, such nexus or connection is missing for each
Premium Fee State with respect to a fund's sales of its shares, even if
143. A separate federal statute prohibits a state from imposing any tax on the transfer
of a security if the only basis for such tax is the fact that the transfer agent is located within
that state. See Exchange Act § 28(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (2011). This does not detract
from the fact that mutual funds' sales of their shares do not occur within the Premium Fee
States and, therefore, may not be taxed by the Premium Fee States. Each state retains
authority to impose a stock transfer tax if the state has a sufficient nexus or connection to
the sale, such as the sale occurring within the state. Exchange Act § 28(d) was added as
part of the Federal Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(1975). The report of the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
stated that Exchange Act § 28(d) was desirable because state transfer taxes might inhibit
unreasonably the development of an efficient national clearing and depository system for
securities. See S. Rep. No. 94-75, 54, 60 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N 179, 232,
238. However, the Committee report also explained that the statute was "designed to
facilitate the development of a national system for handling securities transactions while at
the same time preserving the state taxing powers over transactions with which the taxing
state has a traditional jurisdictional basis for taxation." Id. There is no evidence that
Congress, in enacting Exchange Act § 28(d), was aware of the differences between
transfer agents that acted solely as a registrar with respect to an issuer's shares and
transfer agents for mutual funds. In the case of a mutual fund, receipt and acceptance of a
purchase order by the fund's transfer agent is a condition of sale. Moreover, as described
in the main body of the text, a mutual fund's transfer agent performs multiple functions
beyond those of a bare registrar, including collecting customer payments to purchase the
fund's shares and transmitting these proceeds to the mutual fund's custodian bank.
144. See, e.g., Allied-Signal v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992), Am. Oil Co.
v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965); Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951);
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
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a purchaser is located within the Premium Fee State. Under both the
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, each Premium Fee
State lacks authority to tax these out-of-state sales. This conclusion
follows from each of the out-of-state-sales cases described in Part
V.B, above, in which the Supreme Court, under the Due Process
Clause or dormant Commerce Clause, struck down a state tax that a
state sought to apply to an out-of-state sale.
E. Due Process Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause Fair
Apportionment Requirements for State Taxes
In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court held that fair
apportionment is another independent prong of the Complete Auto
four-part test.'4 Fair apportionment also is required to satisfy due
process concerns. 47 Even if a state has a sufficient nexus with a
portion of the value or activity it seeks to tax, for both due process
and Commerce Clause purposes, the state cannot tax the portion of
the value or activity earned or occurring outside its borders.
Instead, a state's tax on a multistate business must be fairly
145. Interestingly, New York and Texas formerly imposed a stock transfer (stamp) tax
upon the sale of shares of stock. Such transfer tax statutes pre-date the dematerialization
of stock certificates. See generally Martin J. Aronstein, The Decline and Fall of the Stock
Certificate in America, 1 J. OF COMP. CORP. LAW & SEC. REG. 273 (1978). The New York
statute imposed a tax upon any seller with respect to "all sales, or agreements to sell, or
memoranda of sales and all deliveries or transfers of shares." See O'Kane v. State, 172
Misc. 829, 843 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1939), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 439 (1940). This language is virtually
identical to the language in the Texas statute, which was based upon the New York
statute. See Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 0-7059 (Mar. 13, 1946). Authorities in both New
York (see People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184 N.Y. 431, 449 (1906), affd, 204 U.S. 152
(1907); In the Matter of the Petition of Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. (May 29, 1985), 1985
WL 25226 (N.Y. Dept. Tax. Fin.)) and Texas (see Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 0-7059 (Mar.
13, 1946); Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. WW-700 (Sept. 14, 1959)), concluded that the stock
transfer tax did not apply where a sale occurs outside of the taxing state. See generally
Francis X. Mannix, Stock Transfer Tax vs. Transfer Recording Tax: Taxation of
Assignments and Deliveries of Stock Effected Outside of New York, 13 TAX MAG. 398, 401
(1935). Texas, of course, is one of the Premium Fee States, and these authorities pre-date
the modern due process and dormant Commerce Clause analyses. Presumably, today, a
Texas court would reach the same conclusion with respect to sales of mutual fund shares
that occur outside of Texas because Texas lacks a sufficient nexus or connection to those
sales to satisfy due process and dormant Commerce Clause concerns.
146. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
147. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1982);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,436-37 (1980).
148. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 315. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
303 U.S. at 77, 80-81 (1938). See also Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
164 (1983).
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apportioned to reflect the value and activity conducted within its
borders."
The fair apportionment requirement serves two constitutional
purposes. First, the requirement bars states from imposing redundant
or duplicative taxes on a business simply due to the fact that the
taxpayer conducts business on an interstate basis."'o This assures that
interstate commerce is not disadvantaged relative to intrastate
commerce. Second, the fair apportionment requirement limits states
taxing authority to that portion of value that is fairly attributable to
economic activity within the state"' and, therefore, prevents states
from asserting their tax authority to extraterritorial activity and
values.'
149. While the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees can be analyzed as state taxes,
the fees are not state sales taxes. According to the leading treatise, a sales tax is:
a levy imposed on the purchaser's use or consumption of the item sold,
with the tax burden resting on the consumer. To make it more likely that
the economic incidence of the tax is borne by the consumer, state sales
taxes usually are separately stated, and most states prohibit vendors from
advertising that they will absorb the tax. Further, the tax itself is excluded
from the base of the tax. In addition, sales taxes are collected from the
purchaser by the seller and are imposed on a transaction-by-transaction
basis. These features effectuate the understanding that the sales tax is a
discrete charge, apart from the price of an item, that is paid by the
consumer and collected by the vendor.
Walter Hellerstein, STATE TAXATION 1 12.01 (2012 supp.). In contrast, a "business
activity tax" is:
a direct tax-such as a corporate income tax, franchise tax, gross receipts
tax, or capital stock tax-imposed on the profits or income or gross
receipts or capital stock value of a business taxpayer, however measured,
and which is distinct from indirect taxes such as sales or use taxes, which
are essentially in the nature of excise taxes on a transaction or on the use
of property.
Report of the Task Force on Business Activity Taxes and Nexus of the ABA Section of
Taxation State and Local Taxes Committee, 62 TAX LAWYER 935, 936 n.2 (2009). This
distinction is important because, in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175 (1995), the Supreme Court stated that sales taxes, unlike gross receipts taxes, do
not require fair apportionment and, therefore, may be levied without offending the
apportionment prong of Complete Auto. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184-86.
150. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 184; Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
299 n.12 (1997). See also Walter Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp,
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47,
109 (1995).
151. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185; Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989);
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169-70.
152. See Joondeph, supra note 107, at 150 (2002); Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal
Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State
Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 186 (1988).
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To determine whether a state tax is fairly apportioned, the
Supreme Court examines whether the apportionment formula is both
"internally consistent" and "externally consistent."'"
The internal consistency test generally furthers the first purpose
of fair apportionment by asking whether the tax in question results in
multiple taxation of interstate business. To be internally consistent, a
state tax must be structured so that if every state were to impose an
identical tax, there would be no burden on interstate commerce that
intrastate commerce also would not bear." Because each Premium
Fee State limits its notice filing fees to sales made to purchasers
within its boundaries, the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees pass
the internal consistency test.'55
The external consistency test generally furthers the second
constitutional purpose of fair apportionment by preventing states
from asserting their tax authority to extraterritorial activity and
values. External consistency does not examine the consequences of
multiple states enacting the same tax. Rather, external consistency
examines the economic justification for a state's claim upon the value
taxed "to discover whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion
of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the
taxing State."' 6 The "threat of real multiple taxation (though not by
literally identical statutes) may indicate a State's impermissible
overreaching." 7
Therefore, as a separate prerequisite, the external consistency
test asks whether a state seeks to tax "only that portion of the
153. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185 (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 261, Container
Corp., 463 U.S. at 169).
154. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. Applying the internal consistency test, the
Supreme Court has held that a tax that exposes a multistate taxpayer to the risk of
multiple taxation is invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington
State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 644 (1984).
155. The notice filing fees of each Premium Fee State would apply equally to every
mutual fund, regardless of whether the fund is located within or outside the state. Each
state's notice filing fees apply only with respect to sales made to purchasers within the
Premium Fee State. Thus, hypothetical equivalent fees by every other state (with respect
to sales made to internal purchasers) would not result in multiple taxation because the
hypothetical fees would not apply in the case of sales made to purchasers within the
Premium Fee States.
156. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262; Container Corp.,
463 U.S. at 169-70.
157. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
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revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-
state component of the activity being taxed."' An unapportioned
state tax on revenues or receipts from activities occurring outside the
state will be struck down.59 This includes the imposition of a tax by a
Premium Fee State on mutual funds' revenues resulting from sales of
shares because other states, such as the state in which the transfer
agent is located, as well as the state in which the fund has its business
situs," are entitled to tax an apportioned part of the sales revenue.
The Premium Fee States' notice filing fees make no provision for
the apportionment of the value of mutual funds' sales of shares and,
therefore, violate the fair apportionment requirement under the Due
Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. As
unapportioned taxes on mutual funds' revenues arising from activities
that occur outside their borders, the Premium Fee States' notice filing
fees should be struck down.
158. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (citing Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169-70). The Due
Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause require a sufficient nexus or connection
between a state and the interstate value and activity it seeks to tax. See supra notes 109
through 117 and accompanying text. Separately, the external consistency component of
fair apportionment limits a state's tax jurisdiction to assure that a state taxes only its fair
share of an interstate transaction. The intersection between these two requirements has
not gone unnoticed by commentators. See TRIBE, supra note 107, at 1140 n.42 (noting
external consistency operates like a stronger version of the substantial nexus
requirement); Joondeph, supra note 107, at 154 (observing that a state tax that is unfairly
apportioned is likely to extend to interstate values or activities with which the state does
not have a substantial nexus); Jeffrey A. Friedman & Kendall L. Houghton, The Other
Nexus: Transactional Nexus and the Commerce Clause, 4 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 19,26-30
(1999). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has "consistently treated 'external
consistency' . . . as a freestanding prerequisite." TRIBE, supra note 107, at 1136.
159. See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 438-39 (1939); Evco
v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); Cent. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 662-63
(1948); Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 186 ("Finally, in Central Greyhound, we held that New
York's taxation of an interstate bus line's gross receipts was constitutionally limited to that
portion reflecting miles traveled within the taxing jurisdiction."). See also Hellerstein,
supra note 149, at 8.02[3A] (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232 (1987); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 377 U.S. 436 (1964)). Accord Nat'l Liberty Life Ins.
Co. v. State, 215 N.W.2d 26, 37 (Wis. 1974). Sales of mutual fund shares are not localized,
unless the fund and its transfer agent are located within the taxing state. Moreover, the
Court's recognition in Jefferson Lines that a gross receipts tax was "simply a variety of tax
on income, which was required to be apportioned to reflect the location of the various
interstate activities by which it was earned" Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 190, casts doubt
on the validity of unapportioned taxes on gross receipts. See TRIBE, supra note 107, at
1139 n.37 (citing Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra notel50, at 97).
160. Traditionally, the state of a corporation's business situs has been able to assert
jurisdiction over the corporation's income, wherever earned. See Joondeph, supra note
107, at 155 n.31; Hellerstein, supra note 149, at I I 8.02[1I[a][i], 8.02[3A].
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VI. Summary of Conclusions: The Premium Fee States'
Exactions Are Constitutionally Invalid Regulatory Fees and
State Taxes
Part IV and Part V of this article examined the constitutionality
of the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees, which can be
categorized either as state regulatory fees or as state taxes.
Part IV examined the notice filing fees in the Premium Fee
States as regulatory fees. The analysis showed that the notice filing
fees paid to each Premium Fee State were manifestly
disproportionate to each Premium Fee State's cost to police mutual
funds for fraud in the sales of their shares and to administer the
receipts of notice filing fees. Thus, the notice filing fee regime in each
Premium Fee State fails to satisfy the standard approved by the
Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison. Therefore, under the
Bruce Church balancing analysis, each Premium Fee State's notice
filing fee regime imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Viewed as
regulatory fees, under Bruce Church, the notice filing fees in each
Premium Fee State violate the dormant Commerce Clause and
should be struck down.
Part V examined the notice filing fees in the Premium Fee States
as state taxes. To satisfy both due process concerns and dormant
Commerce Clause concerns, a state must have a sufficient nexus or
connection with the value or activity it seeks to tax. Part V showed
that each Premium Fee State lacked this nexus or connection with
respect to the sales of mutual fund shares, even when a share
purchaser is located within the Premium Fee State. Thus, analyzed as
a tax, the notice filing fees exacted by each Premium Fee State violate
both the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause and
should be abrogated.
Part V also examined the notice filing fees in the Premium Fee
States as state taxes for fair apportionment purposes. Each Premium
Fee State's notice filing fee regime is unapportioned and, as a result,
reaches the value of mutual funds' sales revenue attributable to
activity outside of the state's borders. Because the Premium Fee
States' notice filing fees are not fairly apportioned, the fees should be
invalidated on due process and dormant Commerce Clause grounds.
Thus, a fair apportionment analysis provides a separate basis for
concluding that the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees, if viewed
as taxes, are constitutionally invalid.
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VII. Remedies
This Part examines a variety of issues that mutual funds' advisers
and boards of trustees or directors (Board) may want to consider in
developing strategies to recover notice filing fees previously exacted
unconstitutionally by the Premium Fee States, and to persuade the
Premium Fee States to reduce their notice filing fees to adhere to
constitutional requirements.
A. The Financial Stakes
The Premium Fee States' notice filing fees exceed the amount
that can be lawfully exacted from mutual funds as regulatory fees by
approximately $200 million each year.6  This figure represents a very
rough estimate of the amount that mutual funds, in aggregate, would
save in expenses if the Premium Fee States immediately brought their
notice filing fees exacted from mutual funds into line with their actual
expenditures to police mutual funds for fraud in the sales of their
shares and to administer the receipts of notice filing fees.'62
Wholly apart from prospective benefits to mutual funds and their
investors, as compensation for prior years' unconstitutionally exacted
notice filing fees, mutual funds may be able to recover the dollar
amount of these fees paid in each Premium Fee State to the state's
securities regulator." Assuming a three-year statute of limitations, a
ballpark estimate of the aggregate amount that could be recovered is
$600 million, although statutory interest or a longer statute of
limitations is likely to increase this estimate. However, no single state
is liable for the total amount unconstitutionally exacted and,
therefore, no single lawsuit would result in the recovery of the
161. The estimate of $200 million is derived from Table 4. For the 2010 and 2011
fiscal years shown in Table 4, mutual funds' payments to the Premium Fee States averaged
more than $200 million annually. Fiscal 2009 is excluded because, in Wisconsin, effective
July 1, 2009, the maximum annual notice filing fee was increased dramatically, see supra
notes 48 through 50 and accompanying text, resulting in substantially greater notice filing
fees for Wisconsin in 2010 and 2011 compared to 2009. See Table 4.
162. Thus, each year, mutual fund investors stand to benefit prospectively by
approximately $200 million because an expense reduction would be reflected in each
mutual fund's NAV and per-share NAV.
163. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . ..
106 [Vol. 40:1
aggregate amount. There are, after all, six Premium Fee States,
although, as indicated in Table 5, Texas has the largest potential
exposure, and Washington, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are roughly in
a three-way tie for second with respect to the size of their potential
exposures.
B. Cost-Benefit and Collective Action Issues
Virtually every mutual fund would benefit if each Premium Fee
State were convinced to reduce its notice filing fees to adhere to
constitutional requirements. However, the costs associated with
convincing any single Premium Fee State, which may include the
expenses of a lawsuit and related appeals, may be significant. The
costs to any single family of mutual funds may exceed the expected
benefits, in the form of lower notice filing fees and recovery of prior
notice filing fees paid, that are likely to be received by the family of
mutual funds. Thus, it is uncertain whether any single family of
mutual funds would undertake the task of attempting to persuade a
Premium Fee State to reduce its notice filing fees to adhere to
constitutional requirements.
This cost-benefit problem is exacerbated by the fact that should a
single family of mutual funds succeed in persuading a Premium Fee
State to reduce its notice filing fees to adhere to constitutional
requirements, that success would benefit all competing mutual fund
families. The fee reduction would become a public good. Thus, each
family of mutual funds has an incentive to do nothing while a
competitor bears the costs of persuading a Premium Fee State.
Thereafter, every mutual fund family would enjoy the same benefits
as the competitor that incurred the costs of persuasion, but without
paying for those benefits. This situation is simply a collective action
problem (also known as a free rider problem).'"
The cost-benefit uncertainty and the collective action problem
could be overcome by employing a single representative for all
mutual funds, with the costs underwritten by all mutual funds that
stand to benefit from the representative's actions.
164. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcriON: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-2 (1965); Dan M. Kaban, The Logic of
Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71 (2003).
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C. The Minnesota Lawsuit
In fact, the national association of U.S. mutual funds, the
Investment Company Institute ("IC"), already has served as a
representative plaintiff for all mutual funds with respect to pre-
NSMIA state registration fees. Circa 1990, the ICI brought suit in a
Minnesota state district court seeking to have the court strike down
Minnesota's 1973 registration fee statute. The ICI appealed the
district court's adverse decision to the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota, which reported its 1991 decision in Investment Company
Institute v. Hatch.'65
In Hatch, the Minnesota appeals court addressed due process
and equal protection arguments raised by the ICI. Relying on
Minnesota due process precedents, the court acknowledged that "fees
which are grossly disproportionate" to the costs of administering a
regulatory program may constitute a "tax in disguise," which would
be an invalid exercise of state police powers.'6 However, the court
found that the statute's history and other evidence presented were
insufficient to dissuade the court from its conclusion that the statute
''was passed for both regulatory and revenue purposes" and,
therefore, did not violate the Due Process Clause.'
While Hatch concluded that the Minnesota statute, in part, was a
tax for due process purposes, the Minnesota appeals court did not
examine the statute under due process and dormant Commerce
Clause precedents concerning state taxes. This examination would
have entailed analyses of whether (i) Minnesota had a sufficient
nexus or connection with out-of-state sales of mutual fund shares, and
(ii) Minnesota's registration fees were fairly apportioned such that
the fees did not tax the value of mutual funds' sales attributable to
activities outside of Minnesota. If the Hatch court had conducted
these analyses, it would have had to conclude that the Minnesota
statute could not have been passed validly for "revenue purposes"
because, as a tax, Minnesota's fees violated the Due Process Clause
and dormant Commerce Clause and, therefore, should be voided.
165. Investment Company Institute v. Hatch, 477 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
166. Hatch, 477 N.W.2d at 749. This standard is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's "manifestly disproportionate" standard. See supra notes 87 through 98 and
accompanying text.
167. Hatch, 477 N.W.2d at 752. The equal protection claim was disposed of by the
court because the equal protection clause bars classifications "only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary." Id. at 752-53.
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Therefore, today, if a Premium Fee State asserted that its notice
filing fees are taxes, Hatch would not be applicable precedent to
analyze the due process and dormant Commerce Clause issues raised
in this article concerning nexus to out-of-state sales and fair
apportionment, because Hatch never reached these issues.
D. The Federal Tax Injunction Act
1. State Court or Federal Court
If a family of mutual funds or representative claimants
contemplate instigating a lawsuit against one or more of the Premium
Fee States, the federal Tax Injunction Act ("TIA") may affect
whether the suit can be adjudicated in a federal court. The TIA
provides: "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State."'a
The "principal purpose of the TIA [is] to limit drastically federal
court interference with the collection of state taxes,"' in recognition
of the imperative need of a state to administer its collection of
revenue.o The Tax Injunction Act divests the federal courts of
jurisdiction, thereby requiring that constitutional challenges to a state
tax must be brought in the courts of the taxing state. Decisions of the
highest court of the taxing state may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari."' On this forum issue, one commenter has
asserted:
These [state] courts are often unsympathetic to the tax
claims of nonresidents ... [and] the only review of state court
decisions in these tax cases is by writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court . .. In this legal environment, state courts can
choose to play what can be called "the cert lottery," holding
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2011). While the TIA refers only to suits to "enjoin, suspend or
restrain" state tax administration, the TIA has been interpreted broadly to bar claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief, see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393,
407-11 (1982); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943), and to
bar claims for refunds or monetary relief, see Nat'1 Private Truck Council, Inc. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tax
Assessor, 116 F.3d 943, 945 (1st Cir. 1997).
169. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 105 (2004) (internal formatting omitted).
170. See id. (citing Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 409-10).
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2011).
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for the home team while betting on the unlikelihood that
aggrieved taxpayers can get the U.S. Supreme Court to hear
their cases. The state courts will often win this gamble.. .."2
Because the TIA applies to state taxes and does not apply to
state regulatory fees, user fees or other non-tax state exactions,
litigation under the TIA frequently focuses on whether a state's
exaction is a tax."' This determination is a question of federal law,
and how a state has characterized an exaction does not control the
outcome. 74 Instead, whether a state exaction is a "tax under State
law" for purposes of the TIA will be determined in accord with
Congress' purposes in enacting the TIA."'
The leading case in determining whether a state imposition is a
tax is the First Circuit's 1992 decision in San Juan Cellular Telephone
Company v. Public Service Commission,"', written by Judge (as he
then was) Breyer. In San Juan Cellular, the court stated:
Courts have had to distinguish "taxes" from regulatory
"fees" in a variety of statutory contexts. Yet, in doing so, they
have analyzed the legal issues in similar ways. They have
sketched a spectrum with a paradigmatic tax at one end and a
paradigmatic fee at the other. The classic "tax" is imposed by
a legislature upon many, or all, citizens. It raises money,
contributed to a general fund, and spent for the benefit of the
entire community. The classic "regulatory fee" is imposed by
an agency upon those subject to its regulation. It may serve
regulatory purposes directly by, for example, deliberately
discouraging particular conduct by making it more expensive.
Or, it may serve such purposes indirectly by, for example,
raising money placed in a special fund to help defray the
agency's regulation-related expenses.
172. Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 1, 63 (2008) (internal footnote and
formatting omitted).
173. See Hexom v. Oregon Dep't of Transp., 177 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cit. 1999).
174. Wright v. McClain, 835 F.2d 143, 144 (6th Cir. 1987).
175. See id.; Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 581 F.2d 371, 374
(3rd Cir.1978); Bidart Bros. v. California Apple Comm'n, 73 F.3d 925, 929-30 (9th Cir.
1996).
176. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1992).
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Courts facing cases that lie near the middle of this
spectrum have tended (sometimes with minor differences
reflecting the different statutes at issue) to emphasize the
revenue's ultimate use, asking whether it provides a general
benefit to the public, of a sort often financed by a general tax,
or whether it provides more narrow benefits to regulated
companies or defrays the agency's costs of regulation.'?
In Hager v. City of West Peoria,78 another leading case in
determining whether a state imposition is a tax under the TIA, the
Seventh Circuit expanded San Juan Cellular's "ultimate use" test
from the limited question of whether the imposition's revenues are
destined for a state's general fund, to include an analysis of the
purpose of the imposition:
The district court in this case seized on the fact that the
permit fee revenue was earmarked for the general city fund,
and reasoned that under the "ultimate use" test, the permit
fees were a tax. We believe the district court misconstrued
this fact. Rather than a question solely of where the money
goes, the issue is why the money is taken."'
177. San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685 (emphasis added). Other circuits have
followed San Juan Cellular. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir.
1993); Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper County, 123 F.3d 797, 800 (4th Cir.1997); Home
Builders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1998);
Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2000); Hager v. City of West Peoria,
84 F.3d 865, 870-72 (7th Cir.1996); Hexom, 177 F.3d at 1136; Marcus v. Kansas Dep't of
Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1311 (10th Cir. 1999). In San Juan Cellular, and in subsequent
decisions of the Circuit Courts that rely on San Juan Cellular, a variety of factors have
been cited as probative regarding whether a particular state exaction is a tax or a
regulatory fee: (i) whether the exaction was imposed by a state legislature rather than by
an administrative agency; see, e.g., Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Tax Assessor, 116 F.3d 943,
946 (1st Cir. 1997); Bidart Bros., 73 F.3d at 931; San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685; (ii)
whether responsibility for administering and collecting an exaction belongs to a state's
general tax assessor or lies with a regulatory agency; see, e.g., Collins, 123 F.3d at 800
(citing Cumberland Farms, 116 F.3d at 946); Bidart Bros., 73 F.3d at 931; (iii) whether the
revenues raised by the exaction go into a general fund or are deposited in a special fund to
benefit regulated entities or defray the cost of regulation; see, e.g., Cumberland Farms, 116
F.3d at 946 (citing Travelers Insurance, 14 F.3d at 713); San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685;
Collins, 123 F.3d at 800, (citing San Juan Cellular, 967 F.2d at 685); and (iv) whether the
underlying legislation refers to the exaction as a fee or a tax; see, e.g., Hager, 84 F.3d at
871.
178. Hager, 84 F.3d 865.
179. Id. at 870-71 (emphasis in original).
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In Hager, the Seventh Circuit reached the conclusion that a city's
exaction was a regulatory fee to regulate the weight of trucks using
city streets and, therefore, not a tax. The court relied on the stated
purpose of the city's exaction in the text of the city ordinance,
admissions by the city's mayor about the intended use of the
revenues, and the fact that the relevant state enabling statute
authorized the city "to regulate a vehicle carrying loads within the
municipality."" The court noted that, while the funds received from
the permit fee in question were deposited in the city's general fund,
because the fee reasonably estimated the cost imposed by the person
required to pay, the fee was better viewed as a regulatory fee than a
tax.18 1
The Fifth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit each have
endorsed the Seventh Circuit's purpose-driven "why the money is
taken" Hager inquiry to determine whether an exaction is a fee or a
tax for purposes of the TIA.m" The Fourth Circuit has indicated that,
in cases that lie near the middle of the San Juan Cellular spectrum,
the purpose of the statute or regulation containing the imposition is
paramount,'83 and the Sixth Circuit has stated that "the inquiry on
'why the money is taken' instead of 'where the money goes"' is
appropriate28
Finally, the Eighth Circuit also seems amenable to treating, for
TIA purposes, the legislative purpose underlying an exaction as
180. Id. at 871.
181. Id. at 871-72.
182. See Home Builders, 143 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[I1t must be noted
that we are far more concerned with the purposes underlying the ordinance than with the
actual expenditure of the funds collected under it. That is, we look principally to the
language of the ordinance and the circumstances surrounding its passage."); Hexom, 177
F.3d at 1138 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The question, in the long run, is not simply where the money
is deposited at some point; it is what the purpose or use of the assessment truly is...
[E]ven monies paid into the general fund of the treasury are not necessarily taxes."); U.S.
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 761-62 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he
touchstone of our inquiry is the purpose of the assessment ... In judging purpose, we
consider, among other things, the ultimate use of the funds ... But use is not always
conclusive evidence of purpose. Just as the label given by a state for an assessment or
charge is not dispositive of its character .. . neither is the ultimate use of funds dispositive
of an assessment's purpose . .. Thus, rather than a question solely of where the money
goes, the issue is why the money is taken.") (emphasis in original).
183. See Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th Cir. 2000) ("When
the [San Juan Cellular] three-part inquiry yields a result that places the charge somewhere
in the middle of the San Juan Cellular descriptions, the most important factor becomes the
purpose behind the statute, or regulation, which imposes the charge.").
184. Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 614 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000).
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determinative. In Ben Oehrleins and Sons and Daughter, Inc. v.
Hennepin County,"" the Eighth Circuit addressed the validity of a
county ordinance that required county waste to be delivered to the
county's designated facility, at which the waste haulers were required
to pay the county's specified "tipping fees." The Eight Circuit noted
that, for TIA purposes, the ordinance "obviously raises revenue by
way of the tipping fees charged by the [waste] facility."'6 Without
further analysis, the court held that this "does not, however, render
the Ordinance a tax. The Ordinance's primary purpose is clearly
regulatory, rather than revenue-raising.,,m
2. The State Legislature's Intent
If a Premium Fee State's mutual fund notice filing fees were
challenged in a federal court on constitutional grounds, to retain
jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit, following San Juan Cellular and
Hager, the federal court is likely to inquire where the fees go, as well
as why the state legislature imposed the fees. To retain jurisdiction,
the federal court is likely to have to determine that: (i) when enacted
or reenacted," such fees were intended by the state legislature to be
regulatory fees; and (ii) the state legislature did not subsequently
revisit the notice filing fee statute to reclassify the fees as a tax.
If the federal court instead determines that the challenged notice
filing fees were intended to be a tax, the TIA would deprive the
federal court from exercising jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs would be
required to bring their claims in a state court. Therefore, before
commencing an action in a federal court, plaintiffs seeking to
challenge a Premium Fee State's notice filing fees should review the
legislative history of the relevant Premium Fee State's blue sky
statute to determine whether, when the provisions applicable to
185. Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th
Cir. 1997).
186. Id. at 1382.
187. Id. at 1382-83. Accord Marigold Foods, Inc. v. Redalen, 834 F.Supp. 1163, 1166
(D.Minn. 1993) ("To determine whether the Minnesota premium is a tax, the court must
look to the purpose underlying the premium.").
188. For example, in 2002, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws restated the Uniform Securities Act (2002 Uniform Act), which may have
resulted in a Premium Fee State's restatement of its blue sky laws to conform to the 2002
Uniform Act. See, e.g., Minn. Laws 196 - H.F. No. 2514, available at
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/?id=196&year=2006&type=O.
Fall 20121 MUTUAL FUND SALES NOTICE FEES 113
mutual fund fees were enacted,' the revenues were anticipated to
estimate the cost of regulating mutual funds. If the legislative history
suggests that, when enacted, a regulatory fee was contemplated or if
the history is ambiguous, the review also should include an analysis of
whether the state legislature ever revisited the underlying statute for
the express purpose of reclassifying the fees as a tax.
Chronologically, mutual fund sales began to expand rapidly only
in the late 1970s,'" which resulted in significantly greater (pre-
NSMIA) registration revenues to the Premium Fee States. In 1996,
NSMIA provided that, unless subsequently changed by a state, the
fees in effect prior to NSMIA's enactment would continue in effect,
but as notice filing fees."' Therefore, it is possible that the Premium
Fee States' legislatures have never revisited their blue sky fee statute,
which provided for fees originally intended to be regulatory fees, for
the express purpose of reclassifying the regulatory fees as taxes. This
would be a helpful set of facts under Hager, which expanded the
inquiry to include why the money is taken.
E. Issues for Advisers and Boards
This article has asserted that the costs to any single family of
mutual funds may exceed the expected benefits-in the form of lower
notice filing fees and recovery of notice filing fees already paid-that
are likely to be received by the family of mutual funds. Whether this
assertion is accurate, of course, is a question for each adviser to a
family of mutual funds to consider. Notice filing fees are expenses
incurred by mutual funds. The costs to persuade a Premium Fee
State to reduce its notice filing fees to adhere to constitutional
requirements and to seek compensation for notice filing fees
unconstitutionally exacted also would be fund expenses. Therefore, a
family of mutual funds' Board normally would be involved in
deciding what actions the family of funds pursue.
If an adviser and Board conclude that the costs of available
strategies outweigh the expected benefits to the family of mutual
funds, the funds' adviser may decide to coordinate action with other
189. At present, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws'
website indicates that, of the six Premium Fee States, only Minnesota and Wisconsin have
adopted the 2002 Uniform Act. See The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Securities
Act.
190. See supra notes 27 through 29 and accompanying text, and Figure 1.
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2) (2011).
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families of mutual funds to develop strategies to persuade the
Premium Fee States and to seek compensation for notice filing fees
unconstitutionally exacted.
If other forms of persuasion fail, it is possible that litigation may
be required to persuade the Premium Fee States to adhere to
constitutional requirements. The number of law firms with
experience in representing mutual funds and fund advisers in civil
litigation is limited. Moreover, of those law firms, only a subset may
have the litigation expertise and experience required to pursue
successfully claims based on the Premium Fee States' violations of
mutual funds' rights under the Due Process Clause and dormant
Commerce Clause. Such expertise and experience is reflected in the
fees of these qualified law firms. In short, litigation is likely to be
expensive, and a favorable outcome is unlikely to be reached quickly.
However, assuming a representative plaintiff, makes itself
available, the expense of pursuing litigation would appear to be
justified. During the last three years, the six Premium Fee States
have exacted approximately $600 million unconstitutionally."
Eliminating the annual $200 million unconstitutional exaction would
be equivalent, in present value dollars, to a one-time savings by
mutual funds of between $2 billion and $4 billion.'" Therefore, a very
rough estimate of the total value to mutual funds of success in
obtaining compensation from the Premium Fee States for notice filing
fees already unconstitutionally exacted ($600 million), and in
persuading the Premium Fee States to reduce their notice filing fees
to adhere to constitutional requirements ($2 billion to $4 billion), is
$2.6 billion to $4.6 billion.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether the Premium Fee States' notice filing fees
are deemed to be state regulatory fees or state taxes, these fees are
constitutionally invalid and should be struck down.
In present value dollars, the potential benefits to mutual funds,
consisting of reimbursement for notice filing fees already exacted
from the Premium Fee States and future costs avoided, may be $2.6
billion to $4.6 billion.
There are six Premium Fee States. Vindicating mutual funds
constitutional rights may require six separate lawsuits, and the TIA
192. See supra notes 66 and 67 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
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could prevent claimants from having a federal court decide their
claims in any of these lawsuits if the applicable state legislature
intended that its notice filing fee statute should impose a tax.
Therefore, research into the legislative history of the notice filing fee
statute in each Premium Fee State is desirable before instigating a
lawsuit.
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